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On 9 September 2019 Facebook banned from its platforms all pages and profiles
related to the Italian far-right organization “CasaPound”, for the violation of its
Community Standard no. 12 (hate speech and incitement to violence). CasaPound
– whose political program is a classic combination of totalitarianism, militarism
and nationalism – is a relatively small but extremely active group, targeting with
violent actions minorities in suburban slums, political opponents and sometimes left-
wing journalists. On 11 December 2019, the Tribunal of Rome (ToR) adopted the
precautionary measure ordering Facebook Ireland Ltd. to restore the pages and
their content and to pay the losses. The decision raises significant issues in several
respects and might serve as a model to courts beyond Italy.
Although many members have been convicted in past years, CasaPound as such
is yet to be dissolved via existing anti-fascist legislation. It is therefore a “legitimate”
actor in the Italian political landscape, regularly taking part in local and national
elections.
Despite its poor election results, the political danger posed by CasaPound and
similar organizations should not be underestimated. It results from their contribution
to the normalization of fascist-like language and ideas, an ongoing transnational
process in which social media play a crucial role. Given the features of contemporary
political discourse, CasaPound’s very “existence” as a political actor of any
significance depends on its +40,000 Twitter followers and – before the ban –
280.000 Facebook “likes”, without which it would probably be a little less than a
politically-flavored criminal organization. However, and quite importantly, CasaPound
hardly posted online explicitly fascist content, rather saving this kind of speech for
other channels of communication.
The Tribunal’s line of reasoning
The first issue relates to the quite unconventional line of reasoning, which did not
focus on the parties’ contractual obligations, but rather on those arising directly from
art. 49 Constitution (“Any citizen has the right to freely establish parties to contribute
to determining national policies through democratic processes”). Importantly, the
ToR’s decision can only be understood in the context of the right to (collective)
political participation, rather than the – admittedly overlapping but distinct – right to
freedom of expression. Keeping in mind these starting points, the reasoning can be
summarized in three steps.
1. Facebook has de facto reached a systemic role to the purposes of political
participation under art. 49 Const.
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2. Given such systemic role – and departing from a relatively well-established
case law of the Supreme Court (e.g. judg. no. 31022/2015) qualifying Facebook
as a mere “private messaging service establishing a network of relationship
among people in the same system” – the ToR held that Facebook has a “special
position” towards private individuals.
3. As a further consequence, besides the obligations arising from its contractual
will, Facebook is bound by those arising from constitutional principles (principi
costituzionali e ordinamentali). Therefore, although it did not explicitly refer
to such doctrine, the measure constitutes an example of direct horizontal
effect (unmittelbare Drittwirkung), whereby private actors are directly bound by
constitutional duties, i.e. without resorting to constitution-oriented interpretation
of private law or contractual clauses; or to the declaration of unconstitutionality
of applicable legislation.
Having re-shaped the range of Facebook’s obligations, the ToR found that the
complaint concerning CasaPound’s right to political participation had some prima
facie ground (fumus boni iuris) and was potentially subject to irreparable damage
pending ordinary proceedings (periculum in mora), thus granting the precautionary
measure. Although adopted in a proceeding with limited evidence-collection and
prima facie merits assessments – and the ToR itself stressed that the ordinary
proceedings could well turn out differently – the decision still provided several
interesting elements of reflection, especially as concerns the power relationship
between Facebook and CasaPound.
Facebook in the eyes of the ToR: bound by the
Constitution but no “keeper of the Constitution”
Already at the linguistic level, the opinion significantly switches from “Facebook
Ireland Ltd.” (the procedural defendant) to “Facebook” tout court, somehow
downsizing the relevance of corporate personality to the purposes of the decision.
Put differently: The ToR’s language gives the impression that it is not Facebook
as an individuated corporate person to infringe upon the constitutional obligation,
but rather Facebook as a (business) enterprise, a transnational actor in control
of a good amount of the communication flow relevant to political discourse and
participation. Further, the ToR explicitly qualified the ban as a “sanction”, rather than
a countermeasure to a breach of contract.
At a more substantial level, the decision can be framed as a review of the
proportionality of Facebook’s conduct. According to the ToR, the contents shared
by CasaPound did not reach a degree of gravity such as to justify the outright ban,
i.e. a de facto exclusion from political debate: a more proportionate (and possibly
legitimate) reaction would have been removing the single contents, with a more
circumscribed limitation of CasaPound’s single exercises of freedom of speech.
Facebook’s argument, that the ban “sanctioned” the fact that CasaPound is a
political organization intrinsically against the Constitution and human rights law,
was also rejected. Neglecting such role of “keeper of the Constitution”, the ToR
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held that it is not up to Facebook to determine if CasaPound is a legitimate actor in
the Italian political landscape, taking also into consideration that it has been active
for more than ten years without being outlawed by competent Italian authorities.
Admittedly, such statement goes in a direction opposite to that taken in Germany
with the contested 2017 Network Enforcement Law (NetzDG) and in France with the
bill no. 1785, designing systems whereby major social media platforms are tasked
with – and potentially held responsible for – gate-keeper functions against hate
speech and fake news on the Internet.
In a nutshell, the ToR “saw” in legal terms the private power and accordingly
attached obligations to it, but did not recognize Facebook as a legitimate actor to
autonomously take decisions with potentially far-reaching political consequences.
The ToR thus denied Facebook’s authority – at least as long as it uses its power
in a way deemed disproportionate. In this last regard, looking at Facebook as a
global institution and its Standards as a transnational private regulation or even a
semi-autonomous legal system, it could be argued that the decision features some
elements of the Italian ‘counter-limits’ doctrine, the (in-)famous tool of management
of inter-systemic relationship aimed at preventing external legal sources to be
applied into the domestic system, when they risk to jeopardize the “fundamental
principles of the constitutional order”.
The quest for a (transnational) horizontal effect and
the need for supranational regulation
The ToR’s measure stands out for its bold application of (direct) horizontal effect.
Indeed, while the horizontal effect is not a novelty in the practice of Italian courts,
the Italian Constitution – contrary to arts. 1(3) and 9(3) of the German Basic Law
or § 8(2) of the South African Constitution – has no express provision concerning
the scope of application of constitutional rights. As a result, the horizontal effect
has been applied in quite an unpredictable way, mainly on a case-by-case basis.
The differences with the US functional equivalents – the “State action” and “public
forum” doctrines – are especially striking, as even the most advanced application
of these latter require some “color of State law” (see Knight First Amendment
Institute v. Trump, 9 July 2019; Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck,
587 US __ (2019)). Certainly, the US solutions give better guidance to judges and
more certainty to private individuals, but remain largely blind to social de facto
powers that might be able to infringe upon constitutional rights just like State actors.
Therefore, while the dangers to legal certainty should not be underestimated,
such admittedly ambitious attempts must probably be welcomed, in an age where
transnational private (especially economic) powers are more and more able to
escape constitutional constraints.
However, the decision also raises the conflict-of-laws issues typical of any horizontal
effect towards transnational actors. Firstly, the measure is to be enforced by Irish
courts, and it cannot be excluded that an order to restore the access to a social
media platform of a far-right organization may run contrary to the Irish ordre public
under art. 45 Reg. 1215/2012/EU. Secondly, the order may give rise to overlapping
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and conflicting obligations under the laws of other States, e.g. the above-mentioned
German NetzDG. Faced with conflicting impulses coming from different States, a
transnational actor such as Facebook has to select and re-elaborate them in its
internal law- and decision-making. This process inevitably results in a form of legal
Darwinism, penalizing weaker States.
The ToR’s decision therefore highlights the need for a comprehensive hard law
regulation (at least) at the European level, which would go beyond the piecemeal
approach adopted by the EU so far with Dir. 2000/31/EC on E-Commerce;
Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA requiring Member States to sanction by
means of criminal law public incitement to violence or hatred; Dir. 2010/13/EU on
Audiovisual Media Services; and lastly with the 2016 Code of conduct on countering
illegal hate speech online, a soft law instrument of co-regulation, elaborated by the
Commission together with four leading companies of the industry.
However, any form of supranational regulation, especially if restrictive of the rights
of freedom of speech and to political participation, 1) would require a difficult political
consensus, among States interpreting in extremely different ways their identities
of “militant democracies”; and 2) must take into account existing human rights
law. Therefore, it is also worth briefly assessing the ToR’s decision against this
background.
Varieties of “militant democracies” and
compatibility with international law
The obstacles concerning the reach of a consensus among different States on
banning parties from political arenas emerge entirely, if one sees the ToR’s decision
as a manifestation of the Italian (version of) “militant democracy”. The latter has
been famously categorized by Niesen as a “negative Republicanism”, i.e. the self-
definition of a democracy in contrast to a particular authoritarian past. Such “negative
Republicanism” differs markedly from the abstract and quasi-universal German
approach, labelled as “anti-extremism”, not just because it is past-oriented, but also
because it assumes a relatively more fragmented political-ideological landscape, and
thus a reactive rather than proactive attitude towards anti-democratic tendencies.
Such “negative Republicanism” is based on the idea that – instead of being expelled
outside the political arena – extremist movements can be re-absorbed into a
constitutional (“Republican”) consensus through the hidden but constant “normalizing
effect” of democratic procedures. Right or wrong, such attitude gives further
explanations as for why the Italian anti-fascist legislation led to the dissolution of a
far-right organization only once (Ordine Nuovo in 1973); and for the stark rejection
by the ToR of Facebook’s (self-attributed) “gatekeeper functions”. To sum up, the
ToR’s decision does not run against the tenets of “militant democracy” but rather
represents a specific implementation of them.
At the same time, the ToR’s measure cannot be said to infringe upon international
law. After all, there is no positive obligation for States to generally prevent fascist or
any other extremist organizations to access social media platforms. On the contrary,
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under human rights law the right to free speech can only be restricted according to
narrowly defined parameters. Hate speech regulation must carefully weigh freedom
of expression (art. 19 ICCPR) against prohibition of incitement to hatred (art. 20
ICCPR). Indeed, there is only a fine line between the two, visible from the “safety
net” of freedom of expression that human rights instruments often include. The
above-mentioned Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA or the Additional Protocol to
the Cybercrime Convention, for instance, underline that they shall not interfere with
freedom of speech standards. Where such a provision is not explicitly comprised,
States have often brought forward reservations on its basis.
Of course, freedom of expression cannot be understood as to per se cover hate
speech. Art. 10 ECHR, for instance, has traditionally been interpreted by the ECtHR
as to comprise an internal barrier to incitement of hatred (see e.g. Perinçek v.
Switzerland, 15 October 2015). Only very recently has art. 17 on the prohibition
of abuse of a right been applied in the context of anti-Semitic speech (M’Bala
M’Bala v. France, 20 October 2015). Overall, limiting the freedom of expression
nonetheless “must remain an exception”, as even the Rabat Plan of Action on the
prohibition of hatred puts it. For the specific case of online publications, the Human
Rights Committee has also clarified in its General Comment No. 34 that this entails
only “content-specific” removals being permissible. Further, from the case law of
the ECtHR it emerges that, far from being obliged to restrict the overall-access
of an extremist political organization to social media, States are only allowed to
ensure that the respective postings are deleted (Delfi v. Estonia, 16 June 2015)
in cases where single content constitutes unlawful hate speech or incitement to
violence. Without the pivotal element of hate speech or “clearly unlawful” content
the right to free speech is to be ensured (Phil v. Sweden, 7 February 2017; Magyar
Tartalomszolgátatók Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary, 2 February 2016).
A positive obligation has recently been found to exist (Beizaras and Levickas
v. Lithuania, 14 January 2020) but, once again, it concerned only the issue of
investigating whether a posting might constitute hate speech, and not the overall
access to social media.
After this brief excursus, it is fair to conclude that there is no incompatibility between
existing international law and the ToR’s decision. This is especially true, if one
considers its stark distinction between the right to freedom of expression concerning
the single content/posting and the right to political participation concerning the
overall access to social media platforms, as well as the related proportionality
assessment of Facebook’s “sanction”. As formal, problematic and far-fetched as this
distinction may be, it adds further elements of complexity to a decision that probably
will not remain isolated, and whose line of reasoning might serve as a model to other
courts worldwide.
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